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Strategic human capital research has recently expanded to encompass other types of
labor market frictions in addition to those posed by firm-specific human capital. Labor
market frictions inhibit trade in human capital, allowing firms that are idiosyncratically
advantaged with respect to a particular friction to appropriate human capital rents.
Adding to this nascent conversation, I describe how idiosyncratic firm resources and
capabilities enable firms to garner human capital rents. By explicitly distinguishing
between value creation and value capture, which together drive firm-level human
capital rents, this article’s theoretical framework uncovers overlooked circumstances
where firms’ pursuit of human capital rents differ in important ways. I discuss theoretic
propositions and implications to guide future research.
The strategic human capital (SHC) literature is
currently experiencing an explosion of interest.
The general question that has animated this re-
search is “How can firms accrue human capital
rents for themselves?” since the default outcome
in labor markets characterized by perfect compe-
tition is that human capital rents go toworkers. For
years, scholars in this rapidly growing stream of
research fixated on the distinction, handed down
from labor economics, between firm-specific and
general human capital. Firm specificity simulta-
neously solves two distinct problems related to
firms’ human capital rents: (1) the need to drive
up the value that human capital creates and (2)
the need for isolating mechanisms that prevent
workers from selling their services to the highest
bidding firm and, thus, appropriating that created
value for themselves. However, as in other parts of
the strategy field, SHC theorists have begun to
distinguish more explicitly between these two
processes (e.g., Coff, 1999). The former (driving up
created value) can be described as value crea-
tion, while the latter (isolating mechanisms is-
sues) can be described as a part of value capture
on behalf of the firm. Human capital firm speci-
ficity confounds these two issues. Moreover, the
emphasis on firm specificity has tended to limit
SHC scholars’ attention to a specific circumstance
out of a broader class of conditions—labor market
frictions—where human capital can drive firm-
level rents (cf. Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012).
More subtly, applying human capital theory to
firm rents has tended to fix SHC scholars’ atten-
tion on the characteristics of human capital itself,
rather than on the characteristics of firms. In
contrast, the fundamental argument in this article
is that for firms to garner human capital rents,
theymust leverage unique firm-level capabilities
and resources vis-à-vis either human capital
value creation or human capital value capture. In
other words, the firm specificity that matters for
firms’ human capital rents resides not in human
capital itself but in firms’ human capital–related
resources and capabilities.1 Accordingly, in this
article I explicitly take a firm point of view on
human capital rents. Nevertheless, my reasoning
is informed by interactions between individual
workers and firms.
It is important to pause here to consider how
human capital differs from other types of firm re-
sources. Human capital poses unique challenges
(or management dilemmas, as Coff [1997] called
them) compared to other types of resources. These
challenges make firms’ pursuit of human capital
rents distinctively difficult and different from
firms’ pursuit of rents through other types of re-
sources. While a full review of these challenges
lies outside of the scopeof thisarticle, Iwill briefly
describe two of these challenges that are mostThis paper benefited from the comments of Jay Barney, Ben
Campbell, David Kryscynski, Janice Molloy, Wafa Orman,
participants at the 2013 University of Utah Human Capital
Conference, former AMR associate editor Vilmos Misangyi,
and three anonymous reviewers. I thank them for their im-
mensely helpful contributions.
1 To avoid confusion with firm-specific human capital, I
typically use the term idiosyncratic to refer to resources and
capabilities that are unique to firms.
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pertinent to this article: workers’ free will and
workers’ perpetual ownership of their human
capital. Free will denotes workers’ cognitive and
affective reactions to their conditions of work
(Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). As Coff (1997) and
others have noted (e.g., Chadwick & Dabu, 2009),
workers’ thoughts and feelings have a direct im-
pact on what they are willing to do and how hard
they arewilling towork—that is, on the value that
their human capital creates. One implication of
free will is that workers’ utility functions encom-
pass both financial and affective dimensions.
Hence, relationships with firms are both labor
economic exchanges and affective relationships
(Baron & Kreps, 1999), and firms must effectively
manage both aspects of employment to accrue
human capital rents.
The affective side of employment relationships
makes the management of human capital more
varied, less predictable, and therefore less read-
ily leveraged for rents by firms than is the case for
other types of firm resources. For example, it is not
uncommon for workers to quit their jobs because
of dissatisfaction with their immediate supervi-
sor, evenwhen this hurts theseworkers’ economic
interests (Molloy & Barney, 2015). Other facets of
employment relationships that have significant
affective components include how workers iden-
tify with their firms, the intrinsic satisfaction
provided for diverse types of workers by different
types of work, workers’ inclination to give discre-
tionary effort on the job, and workers’ reactions to
job conditions. These topics, of course, have been
extensively studied in such fields as organiza-
tional behavior, human resource management,
industrial relations, and behavioral economics,
although authors in these fields have seldom
framed their interest in these topics around firms’
human capital rents.
Additionally, a dilemma for firms that is posed
by workers’ perpetual ownership of their human
capital is that they always retain the option to put
their human capital to work for a competitor; the
firm can never take ownership of a worker’s hu-
man capital (Becker, 1964; Hart & Moore, 1994). As
one might put this point colloquially, human
capital can only be rented by the firm; the firm can
never purchase it. Consequently, when human
capital rents occur, other things being equal,
workers’ perpetual ownership of their human
capital gives themgreater leverage to bargain for
a portion of the rents that are thus created than is
typical for parties that provide other types of
resources to firms. Indeed, since workers’ owner-
ship of their human capital is perpetual, negoti-
ating worker compensation is a perpetual (albeit
intermittently perpetual) process as well.2
Both of these factors give workers greater bar-
gainingpower to extract aportionof thevalue that
their human capital creates than is typical for the
owners of other classes of firm resources, such as
technology or physical capital. Additionally, free
will creates variance and uncertainty in how
much value a worker’s human capital will gen-
erate. Consequently, for firms, garnering rents
from human capital is complex, with abundant
opportunities for failure, and is a significantly
different endeavor than is pursuing rents from
other types of resources.
While the evolving SHC research conversation
has encompassed some of these salient points in
various publications, we have been hampered in
forming a more comprehensive story of firms’
human capital rents by the SHC field’s previous
emphasis on firm specificity. Thus, in this article
I will break from traditional, labor economics–
based human capital theory and use a combina-
tion of resource-based theory (RBT) and strategic
factor market theorizing to describe where and
how firms’ idiosyncratic resources and capabil-
ities drive human capital value creation and
value capture. In doing so I will describe how
human capital theory and RBT/strategic factor
market theory are mismatched in fundamental
yet frequently overlooked ways. Consequently,
the perspective I propose here allows us to better
see where we currently stand in SHC research
and yields newunderstandings aboutwhere SHC
research could go next.
THE THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN
CAPITAL RENTS
The essential question I consider in this article
is “How does human capital generate rents for
firms?” While the primary outcome of interest in
this study is the human capital rents that accrue
to firms, I will also make frequent reference
to workers’ human capital rents in the arguments
that follow. In line with the majority of SHC
2 Note, for instance, how frequently firms worry that their
most valuable workers will be “poached” by competitors
(Groysberg, 2012; Groysberg & Abrahams, 2006), regardless of
whether those workers’ formal contracts are up for explicit
renegotiation.
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scholars, I will address this question based on
RBTdescriptions of how firm-level economic rents
occur in the context of strategic factor markets.
Rents are the economic profit (profit in excess of
opportunity costs) that accrue to a factor of pro-
duction (which I hereafter call resources in this
article). The emphasis in RBT is on a particular
kind of rent, Ricardian rents. As I will describe
in greater detail, such rents are determined by
productmarket revenues generated by a resource
in comparison to the resource’s next best use.
Ricardo emphasized that variations in the quality
of a resource, combined with inherently fixed
(inelastic) supply, can create rents as higher-
quality versions of the resource generate sus-
tainably greater returns from customers for their
owners (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009). Conversely,
lesser-quality versions of the same resource,
which are valuable but in common supply, are
likely to only “break even”—that is, the value that
such resources generate for their owners over the
opportunity cost of their next best use is small or
nonexistent (Barney, 1991; Barney &Wright, 1998).
In short, resources generate more value when
they lend desirable uniqueness to the products or
services that are sold to customers.
RBT describes how such resources are traded
on strategic factor markets. Strategic factor mar-
kets are markets on which resources that are in-
puts to firms’ value creation processes can be
bought and sold (cf. Barney, 1991). Whenever such
resourcesare indemand,astrategic factormarket
will arise to supply it. When perfect competition
prevails in a strategic factor market, supply and
demandbalanceperfectly such that thevalue that
a resource can generate is completely encapsu-
lated in its factor market price. Consequently, no
rents can accrue from the ownership of resources
that are traded in perfectly competitive strategic
factor markets.
The central tenet of RBT, of course, is that re-
sources can become a source of persistent firm
rentswhenastrategic factormarketdeviates from
perfect competition. Perfect competition has a
number of defining characteristics, including (1)
perfectly available and accurate information
about product quality and pricing, (2) costless
transactions, (3) free exchange between parties in
themarket, (4) freemovement of firms into and out
of the market, and (5) participants that behave in
their rational self-interest. Departures from each
of these conditions may provide firms with op-
portunities to create rents through their resources
and capabilities. For example, if a firm is able to
execute factor market transactions at costs below
the prevailing rate in the factor market, it can
capture the difference in its resource acquisition
costs as an extra margin, along with other po-
tential advantages. The familiar value, rareness,
inimitability, and nonsubstitutability (VRIN) cri-
teria in RBT summarize conditionswhen strategic
factor markets deviate from perfect competition.
These deviations from perfect competition are
commonly labeled in the strategy literature as
market imperfections or frictions (I use “frictions”
in this article).
With respect to rents, it is common for users of
RBT to equate inelastic supply with rareness.
More precisely, however, Ricardian rents in RBT
are rooted in scarcity—that is, in inelasticities in
the supply of a valuable resource on a strategic
factor market (cf. Barney, 1991; Mackey, Molloy, &
Morris, 2014; Peteraf, 1993). This is a crucial dis-
tinction since it acknowledges that supply in-
elasticity either can be an inherent characteristic
of a resource or can be created by market circum-
stances. In other words, scarcity (inelastic supply
on a strategic factor market) drives Ricardian
rents, whether or not the resource is inherently
rare. Even temporary inelasticity in the supply
of a resource can lead to firm rents if it is to the
advantage of a particular firm.3
For example, gold is a commodity that has
a supply that both grows very slowly and is
largely inelastic. A firm that secured most of the
world’s gold supply for itself could have an op-
portunity to earn rents if it managed to do so in
some way that allowed it to pay less than the
going market price for gold (presumably by
leveraging a friction in the market for gold).
However, if a firm could “corner themarket” in the
short term on an inherently abundant and re-
placeable resource, such as wheat, it might also
be able to gain Ricardian quasi-rents from this
ability to leverage a factor market friction. In the
short term, either type of supply inelasticity
(scarcity), inherent or created, can yield rents to
the owners of a resource. The common factor is
firms’ resources or capabilities that allow them to
take advantage of factor market frictions. This is
the essence of isolating mechanisms: a firm’s
3 Properly speaking, when supply inelasticities are fixed
in the short run but cannot be maintained in the long run, as
is likely with most human capital, they lead to Ricardian
quasi-rents.
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ability to leverage market frictions in ways that
shield it from competition in the factor market
in an idiosyncratic fashion. Accordingly, market
frictions that impact all firms in a factor market
in a similar way do not create rents.
Likewise, in human capital, high levels of skill
in medical specialties are not easily acquired in
the short term, a friction in the strategic factor
market for humancapital. (Throughout this article
I use “the labor market” as a shorthand term for
the strategic factor market for human capital.)
If the demand for a particular medical specialty
(say, dermatology) were to suddenly increase,
firms that had claim to that human capital could
capture Ricardian quasi-rents until an increased
supply of dermatologists eventually began to
enter the labor market, even though dermatology
skills are not an inherently rare form of human
capital.
Conceptualizing Firms’ Human Capital Rents
Indeed, aswithRicardian rents fromother types
of resources, firms’human capital rents stem from
cross-firm differences in the quality of human
capital combined with inelasticities in human
capital supply on the labor market (cf. Chadwick
& Dabu, 2009). Barney (1991), Peteraf (1993), and
other RBT scholars have observed that resources
such as human capital create firm rents when the
value that they generate from customers lies
above the firm’s cost of acquiring and retaining
those resources. Thus, when applied to human
capital, RBT/strategic factor market theory posits
that firms’ human capital rents are driven by two
distinct but related issues: (1) characteristics that
drive up the value that human capital creates and
(2) characteristics that drive down the cost of hu-
man capital to the firm. Together, these two pro-
cesses open up a gap between value and costs
that comprise firms’ human capital rents (Molloy
& Barney, 2015).
Figure 1 gives a simple illustration of this con-
ceptual argument. In this figure the value that
human capital generates from customers that lies
above their workers’ next best use of their human
capital (opportunity costs) is split between the
firm and its workers, with the portion of created
value that goes to the firm (net of the firm’s cost of
human capital) comprising the firm’s human
capital rents. In the figure the value that workers’
human capital generates from customers is la-
beled “value in use.” Value in use harks back to
Penrose’s (1995) oft-cited point that resources are
not valuable in themselves but, rather, for the
“services” they can render to firms and to cus-
tomers. Human capital value in use is partially
idiosyncratic to firms, since it is linked both to
human capital characteristics that are applicable
across firms and to complementarities between
human capital and idiosyncratic firm conditions,
such as management practices, technologies,
methods of production, and coworkers. Hence, the
value that a specific worker’s human capital
generates can vary from firm to firm, even if the
worker’s human capital is not itself tied to a par-
ticular firm. Correspondingly, human capital
potential value in use also has a partially idio-
syncratic nature. Potential value in use is the
maximum possible value in use that workers’
human capital can generate for a particular firm.
Thedifferencebetweenpotential value inuseand
actual human capital value in use represents
as yet unrealized opportunities to generate in-
creased value in use.
Of course,workers aswell as firms reap someof
the value that their human capital creates. The
difference between the financial compensation
that the firm pays to workers for use of their hu-
man capital and the compensation that workers
would receive from their human capital’s next
best uses is the human capital rents that accrue to
workers.4 As the terminology suggests, if workers’
compensation from a firm falls below that from
their next best opportunities, they will be moti-
vated to take the latter andwill do so in aperfectly
competitive labor market. It is important to ac-
knowledge here the impact of workers’ affective
relationships to their firms. As has been well
documented in a variety of research streams,
workers’ compensation from a firm is both finan-
cial and nonfinancial. Recall that Figure 1 depicts
human capital rents from a firm’s point of view, so
the value of nonfinancial compensation is not
explicitly included in the depiction of firm rents in
4 To some degree, scholars in the strategy literature have
tended to describe only the economic profits that accrue to
owners of the firm as rents. However, the stakeholder view of
the firm suggests that economic profits that accrue to human
capital–providing stakeholders (i.e., workers) are also rents
(cf. Coff, 2010). Since ownership of human capital cannot be
transferred fromworkers to firms, a viewofworkers as capable
of accruing rents is theoretically consistent: workers are not
just factorsofproductionbutare theprovidersof akey resource
to the firm, just as capital providers are. I thank Ben Campbell
for clarifying this point.
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this figure. However, I will return to this topic
below.
In a way that is analogous to human capital
value in use, the costs of workers’ human capital
to the firm encompass both costs for that human
capital that generalize across firms on the labor
market (sometimes denoted in SHC research as
human capital “exchange value”) and the costs of
acquiring and retaining that human capital that
are more particular to the firm (cf. Chadwick &
Dabu, 2009), such as financial compensation to
workers for firm-specificworking conditions. Note
that both of those types of human capital costs
are specific to individual workers and their work-
ing conditions. However, the costs to the firm for
workers’ human capital also include the admin-
istrative costs of managing firms’ HRM systems,
cultures, and so forth that generalize across larger
groups of workers, perhaps even applying to the
firm’s workforce as a whole. As I describe below,
both worker-specific human capital costs and
these more generalized human capital adminis-
trative costs present the firm with opportunities to
make reductions in human capital costs that in-
crease the human capital rents the firm accrues
from its workers.
Indeed, as Figure 1 implies, firms can generate
greater human capital rents fromworkers’human
capital by broadening the gap between the value
in use of workers’ human capital and the cost that
the firm pays for that human capital. One way to
do this is by raising human capital’s value in use
closer to its potential value (cf. Kraaijenbrink,
2011) through skillful management, such as
through a training program or by creating com-
plementarities with coworkers within the firm. In
this article I label the process of boosting human
capital’s value in use closer to its potential value
FIGURE 1












cost of human capital
Human capital potential value
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human capital value creation. The other way for
firms to increase the rents that they garner from
theirworkers’human capital is to reduce the costs
they pay to acquire and retain human capital,
such as by striking good bargains with workers
over wages or by reducing the administrative
costs of managing human capital. This process is
human capital value capture for firms.
While value capture has frequently been
viewed in the extant SHC literature as synony-
mous with human capital value appropriation
(stemming from reducing workers’ financial
compensation; cf. Coff, 2010), value capture, as I
use the term in this article, encompasses both
value appropriation and human capital admin-
istrative efficiencies. As I describe below, effec-
tive management of either cost can reduce the
firm’s cost of acquiring and retaining workers’
human capital. Human capital value appropria-
tion requires firms to leverage idiosyncratic ad-
vantages with respect to labor market frictions,
such as offering an attractive organizational cul-
ture that serves as meaningful and unique non-
financial compensation for workers. When this
occurs, those labor market frictions become iso-
lating mechanisms that allow the firm to appro-
priate some of the value that workers’ human
capital creates. Administrative efficiencies, too,
can drive down the firm’s cost of human capital,
thus expanding human capital rents to the degree
that these efficiencies reflect idiosyncratic firm
capabilities rather than innovations in effectively
administering human capital that are easily imi-
tated by competitors.
As depicted in Figure 1, the firm increases the
human capital rents it garners from itsworkers by
boosting the value in use of their human capital
and/or by pushing down the cost of theseworkers’
human capital to the firm (for an early statement
of this argument, see Barney & Wright, 1998). The
relationship between the outcomes of these two
related processes determines the human capital
rents that the firm reaps from its workers. For in-
stance, if a firm adopts an efficiency wage and
raises workers’ wages, it can still increase the
human capital rents that it reaps from workers if
the workers increase their discretionary effort on
the job such that the value generated by their
greater productivity exceeds the cost of the wage
increase.
Furthermore, the two processes that determine
value in use and the cost of human capital are
dynamic.Consider, for example,aworkerwhohas
demonstrated greater value in use than the cost
that her employer is paying for her human capital.
Other things being equal, because workers retain
ownership of their human capital, thisworker is in
a position to bargain for a higher wage than was
negotiated before the employment relationship
began, thus potentially shrinking the rents that
her firm captures from her human capital. Con-
versely, an employer may renegotiate to lower
a worker’s wage or to terminate a worker’s em-
ployment when the value in use of that worker’s
human capital falls below the cost of thatworker’s
human capital to the firm.
The Problematic Link with Firm Specificity
Let us now juxtapose the RBT perspective with
human capital theory as it has been employed in
SHC research. Along with RBT/strategic factor
markets theory, the majority of SHC work to date
has also been anchored in the labor economic
distinction between general (or portable) human
capitalandfirm-specifichumancapital (e.g.,Hatch
&Dyer, 2004; Kor & Leblebici, 2005;Mayer, Somaya,
& Williamson, 2012; Wang & Barney, 2006; Wang,
He, & Mahoney, 2009). Becker (1962, 1964) and other
labor economists originally developed firm-
specific human capital arguments to explain var-
iance in individualworkers’wages.Consequently,
applying firm specificity to explain firm-level hu-
man capital rents has some shortcomings that
have hitherto been largely overlooked in SHC
research.
The common firm specificity argument ad-
vanced by SHC researchers is that firm-specific
human capital can drive firm rents because it is
not tradable on the labor market. Thus, firm-
specific human capital is an appealing match to
RBT descriptions of strategic factor market fric-
tions and rents because there is, by definition, no
factor market at all for firm-specific human capi-
tal. In other words, firm-specific human capital’s
nontradability can be an isolating mechanism
that allows firms to capture human capital rents
by driving the cost of human capital down below
its value in use. Nontradability is also a mecha-
nism that may increase human capital value in
use by perpetuating human capital scarcity.
Therefore, firmspecificity seems tobe theepitome
of RBT/strategic factor market logic as applied to
human capital.
Yet human capital theory is a mismatch with
RBT in importantways that have begun to capture
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greater attention from SHC scholars. Perhaps the
most significant recent work that points out these
mismatches is by Campbell et al. (2012), who
suggest that SHC researchers have lost sight of
the central phenomenon that drives human capi-
tal rent appropriation: labor market frictions.
Consider, for instance, that the distinction be-
tween firm-specific and general human capital,
as commonly applied by SHC scholars to firm-
level rents, encompasses the implicit assumption
that the labormarket for general human capital is
perfectly competitive. From this point of view,
then, the only meaningful inhibition to trade in
human capital is firm specificity. Thus, firm
specificity is the condition that allows firms to
capture humancapital rents thatwould otherwise
go to workers.
However, asCampbell et al. (2012) propose, firm
specificity is only one example (albeit a notable
one) of labormarket frictions. Theauthors suggest
that the SHC field’s preoccupation with firm
specificity has caused it to overlook these other
labor market frictions (cf. Wright & McMahan,
2011). Indeed, the labormarket is a strategic factor
market where departures from perfect competi-
tion are both frequent and diverse, giving rise to
avariety of frictions (inaddition to firmspecificity)
that offer firms opportunities to capture human
capital rents. As Campbell et al. (2012) suggest,
these frictions can be of two types: (1) frictions
that prevent workers from putting their human
capital on the market (supply-side frictions) and
(2) frictions that prevent firms from trading in the
labor market (demand-side frictions). Moreover,
Campbell et al. also outline circumstanceswhere
human capital is unlikely to lead to firm rents,
such aswhendemand-side and supply-side labor
market frictions are both weak. Thus, the authors
demonstrate how the predominant firm specific-
ity orientation in SHC research is incompletewith
respect to value capture.
Additionally, I contend that much of the firm-
specific skill or knowledge possessed by em-
ployees, such as understanding how to use the
photocopier, knowing whom to talk to about
reimbursable expenses, and following safety
protocols for proprietary equipment, arguably
concerns simplematters in employees’ dailywork
and is therefore unlikely to generate human cap-
ital rents either because it is easily acquired or
because it is peripheral to the firm’s value crea-
tion processes. For either reason—easy acquisi-
tion or trivial value in use—the firm-specific
human capital that can drive human capital rents
for firmsmaybe quite rare indeed.Moreover, such
human capital is a small slice of the total human
capital that firms put to use each day. Thus, firm
specificity is likely to be only a part of the firm-
level human capital rents story.
Perhaps more important, broadening the focus
of SHC research from human capital firm speci-
ficity to labor market frictions shifts our theoretic
attention from characteristics of human capital
itself to the functioning of the labormarket, which
is a closer conceptual match to RBT. From the RBT
perspective, it is possible for firms to accrue hu-
man capital rents from many types of human
capital as long as labor market frictions favor the
firm idiosyncratically. This, in turn, points our
attention toward firms’ unique resources and ca-
pabilities. Moreover, value capture is only half of
the human capital rents story, along with value
creation, a point that is obscured in the case of
human capital firm specificity, since it confounds
value creation and value capture.
HOW FIRMS ACCRUE HUMAN CAPITAL RENTS
Consequently, away to uncover abroader set of
circumstanceswhere humancapital creates rents
for firms is to explicitly distinguish between these
two related but distinct processes and to describe
how firm-level factors influence each of them in
turn. Figure 2 depicts how key characteristics of
human capital and firms’ idiosyncratic human
capital–related capabilities and resources to-
gether drive firms’ human capital rents.
As I discussed in regard to the relationships
portrayed in Figure 1, the difference between hu-
man capital value in use and the cost of human
capital comprises firms’ human capital rents.
Thus, Figure 2 depicts a negative relationship at
the firm level between the cost of human capital
and firms’ human capital rents and a positive re-
lationship between human capital value in use
and firms’ human capital rents. Of course, the ef-
fects that the various constructs on the left side of
Figure 2 have on firms’human capital rents in any
particular circumstance vary with their relative
strengths. Nevertheless, I can posit some general
causal relationships among these constructs.
On the one hand, as Figure 2 depicts, inherently
scarce human capital and idiosyncratic firm
complementarities increase human capital value
in use. On the other hand, inherently scarce hu-
man capital, human capital administrative cost
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capabilities, and firms’ abilities to idiosyncrati-
cally leverage labor market frictions decrease
firms’ cost of human capital. Additionally, al-
though it is not depicted in Figure 2, generically
valuable humancapital can increase both human
capital value in use and firms’ cost of human
capital, as I describe below.
Inherently Scarce Human Capital
In formulating human capital theory, Becker
and other labor economists were influenced by
the kinds of worker skills that were typically
matched to wages in labor economic models—
namely, such explicitly identifiable compensable
factors as education, credentials, work experi-
ence, and job tenure. These factors reflect skills
that can be developed by workers. Yet if workers’
firm-specific skills aredeemedby their employers
to beobsolete, their personal investments in these
skills can ultimately be worthless. Thus, a re-
curring theme in SHC research is how firms can
induce workers to develop the firm-specific skills
desired by employers in the the face of potential
employer opportunism (e.g., Wang & Barney, 2006;
Wang et al., 2009). One commonly recommended
resolution for this dilemma is for employers to ex-
tend employment security to workers in exchange
for their investments in firm-specific skills.5Amore
complex issue for human capital and firm rents is
imitability. Simply put, if firm-specific human
capital such as employee relations skills can be
learned, then its scarcity will be hard to maintain
in the long term. (Note, for instance, how firm-
specific human capital is commonly described in
SHC research as the result of firms’ and workers’
joint “investments.” If firm-specific human capi-
tal can be created, then its long-term supply is
elastic.) This is another potential source of em-
ployer opportunism. Both of these sources of
employer opportunism increase firms’ bargain-
ing power over value in use after workers have
FIGURE 2


























5 Indeed, such logic is the traditional rationale for internal
labormarkets (Doeringer&Piore, 1971), but it has also been the
implicit (and sometimes explicit) rationale for engaging “core”
workers in high-commitment work systems in the strategic
HRM literature.
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invested in firm-specific skills, but they may mo-
tivate workers not to make such investments.
However, workers and firms face a different set
of challenges in managing human capital that is
an intrinsic (i.e., naturally occurring rather than
created) characteristic of individual workers (cf.
Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). Intrinsic differences
between individuals include such characteristics
as marketing sense, charisma, and cognitive
ability. Because these worker characteristics are
intrinsic, their labor market supply is largely tied
to the rate at which they naturally appear in the
population of workers. Thus, some of this type of
humancapitalmaybe inherently scarce. A subset
of these inherently scarce intrinsic individual
characteristics will generate significant value in
use. J. Crew CEO Mickey Drexler, for example, is
well known for his innate sense of casual fashion.
Truly charismatic leadership is effective pre-
cisely because it is both extremely rare and diffi-
cult to teach. Variance in individuals’ cognitive
ability has been well documented to predict var-
iance in job performance (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter,
1998), and individuals on the high end of the cog-
nitive ability distribution generally have inherent
productivity advantages overmost otherworkers,
particularly for knowledge work.
The dilemma for firms seeking rents from in-
herently scarce human capital is that its scarcity
favors workers because this human capital is
portable across firms, not salable to firms, and
cannot be created. This gives workers with valu-
able inherently scarce human capital consider-
able bargaining power over firms with respect to
the human capital rents created. Thus, inherently
scarce human capital can have a positive re-
lationshipwithhumancapital value inuseand, at
the same time, can also have a positive relation-
ship with firms’ cost of human capital. In fact, to
the extent that the segment of the labor market
for inherently scarce human capital approaches
perfect competition, the value in use generated by
such human capital should be equaled by worker
compensation such that the firm accrues no rents
from this human capital.
If they can’t appropriate its value in use, why
would firms employ inherently scarce human
capital? Firms do this becauseat times they need
such human capital’s unique functionality, even
if they only “break even” on inherently scarce
human capital. One such circumstance is when
complementarities exist with other workers’ hu-
man capital, with other firm resources, and so
forth, as I discuss below.Another circumstance is
when the firm needs certain unique tasks ac-
complished in order to deliver a fully functional
product or service. In such cases inherently
scarce human capital is a critical part of the
firm’s value creation system at the same time
that it is not a source of human capital rents for
the firm. In fact, the lack of required inherently
scarce human capital could lead not only to
a reduction in firm rents but also to human cap-
ital losses for firms if this lack hampers their
ability to meet basic production targets. Such
circumstances give firms an incentive to raise
worker compensation until the cost of inherently
scarce human capital nearly equals its value in
use. (These two figures will not perfectly match
because the cost of inherently scarce human
capital to the firm includes the administrative
costs of supporting such human capital, as I de-
scribe below.) This logic suggests the following
research proposition.
Proposition 1: Inherently scarce human
capital increases both human capital
value in use and firms’ cost of human
capital in almost equal amounts.
Idiosyncratic Firm Complementarities
Another way that human capital can generate
higher value in use is through the existence of
complementarities with other unique resources
and capabilities in the firm (e.g., Mackey et al.,
2014;Molloy&Barney, 2015).MilgromandRoberts
(1992) famously defined complementarities as
a condition where doing more of a particular
activity increases the returns to another related
activity. The complementary resource that has
received the most attention in SHC research is
coworkers’ human capital (cf. Barney, 1991;
Crocker & Eckardt, 2014). For example, lawyers
have large amounts of human capital that are
particular to themselves, such as legal experi-
ence, the ability to argue persuasively, the ability
to prepare influential legal briefs, and so forth.
However, in some types of legal work, such as
business acquisitions, teams of lawyers are
needed to handle the volume and complexity of
clients’ transactions. In this type of work, com-
plementarities with coworkers that are particular
to the firm create value for customers that goes
beyond a simple aggregation of individual law-
yers’ abilities.
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SHC researchers have recently given greater
attention to this theme, often drawing on social
capital theory to suggest that the value in use of
workers’ human capital can be enhanced by their
relationships with coworkers in a particular firm
(e.g., Campbell, Saxton, & Banerjee, 2014).6 Fur-
ther, Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, andMaltarich (2014)
have argued that human capital complementar-
ities with coworkers’ human capital can be idio-
syncratic to the firmbecause they are the complex
product of idiosyncratic social, affective, and be-
havioral processes. Similarly, Groysberg’s work
on the productivity of stock market analysts
(e.g., Groysberg, 2012; Groysberg & Abrahams,
2006) suggests that human capital value in use
has a strong idiosyncratic element because of
complementarities with an array of idiosyncratic
firm resources, such as coworkers’ human capi-
tal, the firms’ internal and external relationship
networks, and organizational cultures. Conse-
quently, star analysts who are poached by com-
petitors are unlikely to generate asmuch value in
use at their new firms as they created at their
former firms. This point implies that firms are
more likely to see rents from poaching individual
workers who have few complementarities with
their current firm, both because their current
value in use is simpler to ascertain and price ap-
propriately and because such workers’ perfor-
mance is centered in their individual human
capital and, thus, more easily transferred to an-
other firm.
As Groysberg’s work suggests, SHC scholars
have begun to explore how complementarities
with a variety of firm resources in addition to co-
workers’ human capital can enhance value in use
(e.g., Mackey et al., 2014). For example, Vomberg,
Homburg, and Bornemann (2015) recently exam-
ined complementarities between human capital
and brand equity. Similarly, the implicit story in
most strategic HRM (SHRM) research concerns
complementarities between human capital and
HRMsystems that drive up human capital value in
use by, for instance, eliciting greater discretionary
effort fromworkers.Clearly, thevarietyofpotential
complementarities between human capital and
other, idiosyncratic firm resources is wide. Thus,
multiple human capital complementarities can be
at play in a firm simultaneously. For example,
professional football players bring large amounts
of individualized human capital to their jobs.
However, complementarities with their teams’
coaching talent, with other players on the team,
with the teams’ preferred style of play, with team
culture and tradition, with geographic locale, and
so forth can add extra value in use to what the
players themselves bring to the team. Such argu-
ments suggest the following research proposition.
Proposition 2: Idiosyncratic firm com-
plementarities increase human capital
value in use.
In sum, idiosyncratic complementarities are
drivers of human capital rents for firms because
they increase value in use in ways that cannot
be achieved with the same human capital at an-
other firm. Thus, idiosyncratic complementarities
give human capital value in use its firm-specific
character. Since idiosyncratic complementarities
do not occur without their firms’ participation in
the employment relationship, firms rather than
workers have strong claims on the majority of
the value in use that such complementarities
generate (cf. Mackey et al., 2014). In other words,
idiosyncratic complementarities’ can increase
human capital value in use with relatively small
concurrent increases in the cost of human capital.
Consequently, firm complementarities are likely
to be a key driver of the variance in human capital
rents across firms.
However, while firms have a bargaining ad-
vantage over the human capital rents that idio-
syncratic firm complementarities help to create, if
firms drive too hard a bargain over such human
capital rents, workers may become disaffected.
Therefore, it is likely that firms will pay workers
a portion of the value in use created by firms’ idi-
osyncratic resources and capabilities (cf. Molloy &
Barney, 2015). In fact, because engaging workers’
free will is so difficult for firms to do, complemen-
tarities that successfully encompass an affective
dimension may be the complementarities that are
especially important in determining cross-firm
differences in human capital rents.
Administrative Cost Capabilities in Managing
Human Capital
A factor affecting firms’ cost of human capital
that has hitherto been largely overlooked in SHC
6 It is important to note that SHC scholars have often
considered workers’ relationship networks as a form of
individual-level human capital. In contrast, the relation-
ships that I mention here are those available in the firm to
workers collectively and, thus, are a firm-level resource.
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scholarship is the role of administrative cost ef-
fectiveness in managing human capital. Firms’
cost of human capital encompasses both worker-
specific compensation and the indirect human
capital “infrastructure” costs that firms pay to
acquire and retain workers’ human capital, in-
cluding the costs of training programs, employee
relations programs, HRM systems, maintenance
of the firm’s culture, and so forth. This latter typeof
human capital cost generalizes across groups of
workers. Human capital administrative capabil-
ities can help firms capture a larger share of the
value that workers’ human capital creates by
driving down the cost of human capital. However,
this process is not value appropriation, which
concerns how the value that human capital gen-
erates fromcustomers isdividedbetweenaworker
and the firm. Thus, human capital administrative
effectiveness is value capture, even if it is not
value appropriation.
Much human capital administrative cost effec-
tiveness pertains to activities that all firms per-
form. Indeed, some of the most important human
capital management practices, such as consis-
tent payroll administration, are common across
firms and, thus, are competitively differentiating
only when firms perform them poorly. Neverthe-
less, the impact of such cross-firm differences in
humancapital administrative efficienciesmaybe
substantial. Chadwick, Ahn, and Kwon (2012), for
example, reported that the relative efficiencywith
which firmsmanage their human capital can vary
markedly and may be a more important driver of
differences in firms’ financial performance than
areHRMpractices’effects on firms’ revenues. This
seems to be particularly true for firms that are
very low in relative human capital management
efficiency.
SHRM scholars have begun to investigate hu-
man capital administrative efficiencies by trying
to capture the effectiveness with which HRM
practices are administeredwithin firms, although
to date this nascent stream of research has not
typically distinguished between commonplace
and more idiosyncratic HRM practices. Some of
firms’ most inimitable administrative cost capa-
bilities appeal to workers affectively as well as
instrumentally. For example, Nishii, Lepak, and
Schneider (2008) documented how employees’ at-
tributions regarding managers’ motivations in
implementing a human capital management
practice can profoundly influence the worker be-
haviors that the practice induces. While the
extant evidence is sparse, such work suggests
that firm heterogeneity in human capital admin-
istrative capabilities can be another contributor
to the Ricardian rents that RBT scholars describe.
Here again, firms’ human capital rents are an-
chored in their idiosyncratic human capital–
related capabilities.
Proposition 3: Idiosyncratic human
capital administrative cost capabilities
decrease firms’ cost of human capital.
Abilities to Idiosyncratically Leverage Labor
Market Frictions
Letusnext examine labormarket frictionsmore
closely. Frictions concern the value appropria-
tion portion of the value capture process. Econo-
mists generally regard frictions as undesirable
because they can reduce the efficiency with
which markets allocate resources for society. In
perfect competition, firm-level differences in re-
sources and capabilities that affect competition
arequickly dissipated on strategic factormarkets
as competitor firms acquire the advantageous
factor. Thus, firms in such markets are not ex-
pected to generate returns beyond their costs of
doing business. In contrast, strategy scholars
regard market frictions as potentially desirable
from a firm’s point of view (Nelson, 1991). Indeed,
RBT can be described as a theory of strategic
factor market deviations from perfect competi-
tion (i.e., frictions) that prevent competitors from
quickly acquiring, imitating, or substituting for
competitively valuable resources and capabil-
ities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Consequently,
the rents generated for firms by these resources
and capabilities can be persistent rather than
temporary.
More specific to the arguments in this article,
labor market frictions can give firms opportuni-
ties to appropriate value in use that workers’ hu-
man capital creates by inhibiting workers’ ability
to trade on their human capital in the labor mar-
ket. For instance, a common typeofmarket friction
is asymmetric informationabout product quality,
such as when sellers more accurately compre-
hend the value of their products than do potential
purchasers. Other things being equal, human
capital information asymmetries depress firms’
demand for humancapital bymaking the returns to
human capital more difficult to predict (a version of
the “market for lemons” phenomenon). Information
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asymmetries regarding human capital are likely
to be commonplace because human capital
value in use has an idiosyncratic component that
is difficult to predict prior to an employment
relationship. Note, for instance, that objective
measures of human capital, such as education
and experience, express workers’ value to firms
generally rather than with respect to a firm’s id-
iosyncratic conditions.
Accordingly, an idiosyncratic firm capability
that resolves information asymmetries regarding
the quality of potential workers within the firm’s
value creation system could increase that firm’s
human capital–related rents, particularly if the
capability cannot be easily replicated by com-
petitors. For example, Chadwick and Dabu (2009)
cited corporate internship programs as vehicles
for building firms’ knowledge about workers’ po-
tential idiosyncratic value in use. A particular
firm’s internship program that runs more effec-
tively than those of its competitors can enhance
human capital rents because this firm may be
better able to identify valuable human capital
and secure it at a wage that ensures human cap-
ital rents for the firm. Indeed, a key human capital
management capability may be the ability to
identify valuable, inherently scarce human capital
more effectively than competitor firms (Chadwick&
Dabu,2009).Thisapproachharksback toMakadok’s
(2001) distinction between resource-picking and
capability-building approaches to resource-based
competitive advantage. The former, resource pick-
ing, appears to be Nike’s approach to nurturing
promising athletes at the beginning of their careers
as future celebrity endorsers of its products, for
example.
Because it is particularly difficult for firms to
engage workers’ free will, firms’ capabilities re-
lated to the affective side of employment relation-
ships may offer especially fruitful opportunities
for them to leverage labor market frictions in
ways that differentiate them from competitors.
For example, workers who feel normative com-
mitment to a firm may be willing to forgo oppor-
tunities to sell their services on the labor market
in order to further the firm’s mission. One of the
chief advantages of commitment-based work
systems, for instance, is that they create a climate
of reciprocal social exchange between the firm
and workers that encourages them to continue
that relationship, even if it is somewhat eco-
nomically disadvantageous to do so (Bowen &
Ostroff, 2004). Moreover, capabilities that engage
workers affectively are especially difficult for
competitors to copy.
Similarly, idiosyncratic abilities to advanta-
geously negotiate with workers over their wage
ratesmaygivea firmgreater human capital rents.
The fact that workers retain perpetual ownership
of their human capital lends importance to the
effort to leverage labor market frictions to drive
down the cost of human capital, since firms’ de
facto bargaining over worker compensation is
correspondingly (if intermittently) perpetual. In
terms of Figure 2, other things being equal, labor
market frictions enable firms to capture greater
rents by driving down the cost they pay to acquire
and retain human capital. This logic suggests the
following theoretic proposition.
Proposition 4: Capabilities that allow
firms to idiosyncratically leverage la-
bor market frictions decrease their cost
of human capital.
Since a firm’s cost of worker compensation in-
cludes both the generalmarket rate for the human
capital in question and worker compensation
for idiosyncratic firm conditions, we can refine
this general argument by distinguishing be-
tween labor market frictions’ effects on these two
components—that is, some labor market frictions
may relate primarily to the general market rate
for human capital, whereas other labor market
frictions may primarily pertain to compensation
for idiosyncratic firm conditions. Coupled with
Campbell et al.’s (2012) prior distinction between
demand-side and supply-side labor market fric-
tions, this point suggests that the labor market
frictions that are relevant to firm rents are of four
types: (1) demand-side frictions that affect general
market rates for human capital, (2) supply-side
frictions that affect general market rates for
human capital, (3) demand-side frictions that
affect worker compensation for idiosyncratic
firm conditions, and (4) supply-side frictions that
affect worker compensation for idiosyncratic
firm conditions.
Accordingly, each of these four types of labor
market frictions offers a firm different ways to
reduce its cost of human capital, thus increasing
its human capital rents. For example, a firm could
leverage demand-side frictions that affect human
capital market rates if it could negotiate for itself
an exception to a government regulation that
makes hiring a particular kind of worker less de-
sirable. An example of a supply-side friction that
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affects human capital market rates is when a firm
is branded as a preferred employer among the
pool of potential employees, thus giving it an
advantage over other firms in appealing to po-
tential workers. Rivera (2012), for instance, dem-
onstrated that elite professional service firms
can have preferential access to human capital
to the degree they match workers on lifestyle
markers such as leisure pursuits and pre-
sentation styles. A demand-side friction with
respect to worker compensation for idiosyn-
cratic conditions is an effective internship pro-
gram that resolves information asymmetries
regarding potential workers’ value in use at
a particular firm, as I discussed above. Finally,
a supply-side friction that influences worker
compensation for idiosyncratic conditions in
favor of the firm is a clause in professional ath-
letes’ labor arrangements preventing rookie
players from freely shopping their services to
teams in the league. If a rookie becomes a good
performer early in her career, her team appro-
priates value in use from her, some of which is
particular to that team, until the player achieves
free agency. Thus, distinguishing between
these types of labor market frictions more pre-
cisely allows us to specify how firms can lever-
age labor market frictions in greater detail.
Generic Human Capital
Another factor that can influence human capi-
tal rents is generic human capital, such as
workers’ basic math, accounting, and manage-
rial competencies. This kind of human capital is
generic in that it is either intrinsically common-
place in workers or easily acquired by workers
when needed. In either case, such human capital
is not scarce because its supply is either in-
herently abundant or readily expandable.7 Thus,
when firms face a shortage of generic human
capital that temporarily drives up the cost of
worker compensation, more workers with the
requisite generic human capital enter the labor
market and quickly drive the market wage back
down. This dynamic puts a ceiling on the cost of
generic human capital for firms. Consequently,
rents for workers from generic human capital are
usually trivial.
Because such human capital is commonplace,
its basic functions in firms’ value creation systems
tend to be easily replicated across competitors.
This drives the value in use for generic human
capital downward toward its cost to firms, nar-
rowing human capital rents for firms aswell as for
workers. In fact, the impact of generic human
capital on value creation may be largest in those
cases where, for some reason, required generic
human capital is lacking. For example, basic
computer support services may not differentiate
a firm by creating idiosyncratic value, but if the
firm does not have enoughworkers to perform this
function, some of the firm’s cost effectiveness will
be lost (cf. Porter, 1996).
In terms of Figure 1, this reasoning suggests
that generic human capital value in use approx-
imates the cost of generic human capital. Simul-
taneously, the cost of worker compensation for
generic human capital approximates its next best
use. Thus, opportunities for human capital rents
for either party, firms or workers, are small with
respect to general human capital. An exception to
this dynamic that may lead to firm rents is, as I
discussed previously, when a firm can reduce its
human capital administrative costs in ways that
competitors cannot replicate, leading to a human
capital cost advantage for the firm. In fact, since
the gap between value in use and the cost of
worker compensation is narrow with generic hu-
man capital, if the firm is not operationally effec-
tive in administering generic human capital, it
may easily realize losses rather than rents from
generic human capital. Consequently, idiosyn-
cratic human capital administrative competen-
cies are a key determinant of firm losses from
generic human capital.
Proposition 5: Firms’ idiosyncratic ca-
pabilities to efficiently administer hu-
man capital affect whether they realize
human capital losses from generic hu-
man capital.
The other ways that generic human capital
can create rents for firms are connected to the
other idiosyncratic firm capabilities I discussed
previously—namely, the abilities to leverage la-
bor market frictions or to create complementar-
ities. Specifically, the capabilities to leverage
labor market frictions can amplify the somewhat
7 This concept has some similarity to the more familiar
concept of portable (general) human capital from human cap-
ital theory, yet in keeping with this article’s theoretic orienta-
tion, the emphasis here is on scarcity per RBT/strategic factor
markets theory rather than on whether the human capital is
applicable across firms. Indeed, some portable human capital
is far from generic.
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negative relationship between generic human
capital and the cost of human capital, while the
capabilities to create firm complementarities can
enhance the somewhat positive relationship that
exists betweengeneric humancapital and value in
use. In a sense, firms can use labormarket frictions
or complementarities to make generic human cap-
ital either less easily tradable on the labor market
or less generic in creating value, respectively, and,
thus, theycan increase their opportunities togarner
rents from generic human capital. For example,
Chadwick and Dabu (2009) noted how generic hu-
man capital can be enhanced by cospecialization
with organizational capital and other types of re-
sources with which it interacts within a firm’s ca-
pabilities (cf. Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). Further, if
a firm can lock in a supply of generic human capi-
tal, say, by holding its workers to noncompete
agreements that limit their mobility from firm to
firm, the firm may be able to drive down the costs
that it pays for this human capital to open a larger
gap with its value in use.
To cite another example, labor market frictions
may explain why, contrary to the received firm-
specific human capital theory argument, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that firms generally garner
sizable positive returns from investments in gen-
eral skills training (e.g., Bartel, 2000). For instance,
someworkersmay bewilling to forfeit some of the
value their increased general skills create if their
firms are able to increase the affective and fi-
nancial costs of switching employers. Addition-
ally, workers who receive general skills training
may forgo capturing all of the increased value in
use of their general human capital because firms’
training investments engender feelings of reci-
procity that appeal toworkers affectively (Baron&
Kreps, 1999)—that is, because firmshaveengaged
workers’ free will. This dynamic may induce
workers to remain with a firm for compensation
that lies below the compensation available at
their human capital’s next best use. This logic
suggests the following research proposition,
complementing Proposition 5.
Proposition 6: Firms’ idiosyncratic ca-
pabilities to leverage labor market
frictions or to create complementarities
with generic human capital determine
whether they realize human capital
rents from generic human capital.
In sum, I posit that absent the effects of idio-
syncratic firmcapabilities toefficientlyadminister
human capital, to leverage labor market fric-
tions, or to create idiosyncratic firm comple-
mentarities, generic human capital is unlikely
to generate more than very small rents for
firms. This point has potentially far-reaching
implications for a number of research streams.
For example, this discussion puts a finer point
on the voluminous findings regarding HRM
systems and firm performance that have
emerged from the SHRM literature (e.g., Combs,
Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006; Subramony, 2009).
HRM systems that increase the generic human
capital of the firm—human capital’s ability, moti-
vation, and opportunities to contribute to the firm
(the “AMO” model; cf. Lepak, Liao, Chung, &
Harden, 2006)—may drive firm rents if they are
linked to idiosyncratic human capital manage-
ment capabilities. If the human capital in question
is generic ability, motivation, and opportunities to
contribute, however, and if the HRM system is also
acommonly implementedversionof a commitment-
based HRM system (i.e., high-performance work
systems; cf. Posthuma, Campion, Masimova, &
Campion, 2013), the chances for human capital
rents for the firm (absent advantageous labor
market frictions) are slim.
This point can be masked empirically if the
emphasis in a study is on predicting firm-level
labor productivity rather than on revenues net of
costs (which gets closer to rents). This concern
about SHRM research has been expressed by
anumberof observers (e.g., Barney&Wright, 1998;
Macky & Boxall, 2007). Moreover, it is likely that
the human capital rents that accrue to firms from
these HRM systems are driven by the customized,
idiosyncraticportionof theseHRMsystems, not by
those HRM practices that can be implemented
relatively uniformly across firms (cf. Chadwick &
Dabu, 2009; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011).8
DISCUSSION
A fundamental question addressed in this arti-
cle concernswhy human capital rentswould go to
firms rather than to the workers whose human
capital generates rents. As I mentioned at the
8 Acknowledgingourearlierdiscussionofworkers’ freewill,
note that the idiosyncratic portion of HRM systems that drives
cross-firm heterogeneity in human capital rents can encom-
pass such factors as the climate of the labor-management re-
lationship in addition to the technical effects of the HRM
practices.
512 JulyAcademy of Management Review
beginning of the article, the majority of the SHC
literature to this point has, either implicitly or
explicitly, made it seemas if firms’ human capital
rents are a function of the human capital itself. As
I argue in this article, human capital rents for
firms emerge from firms’ idiosyncratic resources
and capabilities. One might argue that this is the
case for firm rents from any type of resource, not
just human capital, but the dynamics play out
differently with respect to human capital than
they do for other resources, particularly because
workers have perpetual ownership of their hu-
man capital and because firms must appeal to
workers’ freewill both cognitively andaffectively.
For instance, a critical challenge in achieving
rents from inherently scarce human capital is that
firms can never buy such human capital from
workers. Instead, firms need to continuously en-
gage workers who have needed and inherently
scarce human capital in order to retain its ser-
vices in generating rents. Even in the case of firm-
specific human capital, firms’ capture of rents
fromsuchhumancapital stems from idiosyncratic
firm capabilities, such as the ability to induce
workers to make firm-specific human capital
investments.
As I mentioned at the beginning of the article,
the SHC research conversation has been broad-
ened significantly in recent years. A number of
new themes have grown out of this discussion,
including labor market frictions, human capi-
tal management capabilities, inherent versus cre-
ated human capital, human capital scarcity, firms’
human capital complementarities, the strategic
value of HRM practices, and so forth. This article
weaves these disparate themes together into
a more comprehensive view of firm-level human
capital rents. For example, many of the argu-
ments to date in the SHC literature have empha-
sized how value is appropriated between firms
and workers (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012), which
itself is a complex subject. Yet a related key topic
is human capital value creation (e.g., Molloy &
Barney, 2015; Ployhart et al., 2014). Together, an
eye towardbothvalue captureandvalue creation
gives a fuller view of firms’ human capital rents.
Moreover, as I discussed above, the factors that
drive value creation and value capture can dif-
fer significantly, particularly in specific contin-
gencies, and this article has worked tomore fully
map those theoretic relationships. In doing so I
have endeavored to anchor the SHC literature
more firmly to the RBT/strategic factor markets
perspective, to which it so frequently bears
homage.
For instance, while Campbell et al.’s (2012) ar-
ticle is persuasiveand important, it is still difficult
to predict whether firms will garner human capi-
tal rents inamajorityof the circumstances that the
authors outline. Specifically, in Campbell et al.’s
framework, when supply-side and demand-side
labor market frictions are mixed between high
and low states, firms’ human capital rents are
uncertain. Thus, while Campbell et al. open the
door to a wider consideration of the labor market
frictions that allow firms to appropriate human
capital rents, human capital value creation has
not heretofore received as comprehensive a re-
vision. Moreover, the issue of human capital ad-
ministrative capabilities is not part of these
authors’ value capture framework.
In other words, this article’s major contribution
to SHC research lies in integrating different hu-
man capital–related constructs and proposing
their basic interrelationships. In general, on the
one hand, the cost of human capital is related to
ownership-based bargaining power, with such
factors as inherently scarce human capital and
nonfinancial compensation increasing or de-
creasing that bargaining power for workers and
firms. On the other hand, labor market frictions
generally may modify human capital scarcity to
firms’advantage.Other factors suchas inherently
scarce human capital and firm complementar-
ities have direct relationships with value in use.
The arguments in this article also suggest some
points that are new to the SHC literature, such as
the importance of firms’ administrative effective-
ness in managing human capital. Such effec-
tiveness can lead to greater value capture for
firms, but it is also possible that value capture can
be hindered by human capital administrative in-
efficiencies. When the gap between value in use
and the cost of worker compensation is very nar-
row (such as with generic human capital), it is
even possible that human capital administra-
tive inefficiencies may generate human capital
losses. Typically, SHC research focuses on fac-
tors that affect the size of the gap between value
in use and the cost of human capital, but the idea
that this gap could be turned into losses is
a point that is rarely acknowledged in the extant
literature.
Moreover, I have suggested that the factors that
influence value in use and the cost of human
capital can have significant interrelationships
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with respect to human capital rents (for clarity,
these interrelationships are not represented in
Figure 2). For example, a firm’s ability to leverage
labor market frictions may lessen the bargaining
power of workers over the value in use created by
their inherently scarce human capital. In such
ways these interrelationships suggest boundary
conditions that the key constructs in this article’s
arguments impose on each other with respect
to firms’ human capital rents (cf. Armstrong &
Shimizu, 2007). This topic is a rich opportunity for
future research, since other interrelationships
between key constructs, beyond those discussed
in this article, are likely to exist.
Implications for Strategic Choice and
Managerial Human Capital
Additionally, the relationships outlined in this
article pose intriguing questions with respect to
firms’ strategic choices. Traditional RBT is ag-
nostic about managerial action, since this theory
emphasizes the consequences and perpetuation
of firm-level heterogeneity rather than its origins.
Strategy scholars have begun extending RBT to
address this topic under the resource orchestra-
tion label (e.g., Helfat, 2007; Sirmon,Hitt, Ireland,&
Gilbert, 2011). The essential argument in resource
orchestration is that managers’ abilities and
choices in bringing resources to bear on strategic
issues are one of the most important long-term
drivers of firm rents, a view that is consistent with
the arguments in this article. For example, in
some circumstances it may be more fruitful for
a firm to invest in capabilities that create human
capital complementarities and to minimize its
requirements for inherently scarce human capital
by deskilling jobs. In other instances it may be
valuable for a firm to identify inherently rare hu-
man capital more effectively than competitors,
allowing it to acquire that human capital at
a discount relative to its potential value in use.
In fact, it is possible to extend this argument: if
firms’humancapital rents areprimarily drivenby
their human capital–related capabilities, then
how firms purposely create and manage those
capabilities is, perhaps, the key strategic ques-
tion in SHC research. For example, all else being
equal, value in use is the ceiling of the cost that
rational firms will pay for any type of human
capital, but this value may not always be appar-
ent prior to the start of an employment relation-
ship. This can be particularly true when complex
complementarities within groups of workers
make it difficult to determine how much value in
use can be tied to individuals. Thus, a specific
humancapitalmanagement capability regarding
labor market frictions is the ability to accurately
determine the future value in use of a worker’s
human capital. More generally, this point sug-
gests that firm-level resources and capabilities
are the critical unit of analysis for predicting
firms’ human capital rents.
Firms’ human capital–related capabilities rely,
in turn, onhuman capital and other firm resources
that reside in those human capital–related capa-
bilities. Thus, thehumancapital that is embedded
in firms’ human capital–related capabilities may
be, in the end, the human capital that ismost vital
to firms’ human capital rents. This human capital
can reside in many different workers, including
HR professionals, line managers, and even non-
managerial workers (cf. Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).
Accordingly, how firms’ human capital–related
capabilities originate and work in practice is
a compelling topic for future research. For in-
stance, this topic adds a strategic flavor to SHRM
concerns about the value of in-house HRM de-
partments (e.g., Welbourne & Cyr, 1999). This ar-
ticle’s framework suggests that an in-house HRM
department can be strategically valuable when it
helps its firm leverage labor market frictions or
reduce administrative human capital costs more
effectively than other firms, allowing the firm to
reap greater rents by driving down the cost of
human capital. Moreover, HRM departments can
increase value in use when they enhance their
firms’ abilities to generate complementarities
between human capital and other firm resources.
When an in-house HRM department does not
perform these functions, HRM within the firm be-
comes primarily an efficiency concern that is
vulnerable to cost-based outsourcing in order to
prevent human capital losses stemming from
administrative inefficiencies. Nevertheless, even
administrative HRM can enhance human capital
rents if the firm is able to create administrative
capabilities that are scarce, inimitable, and
nonsubstitutable.
This article’s perspectives may also offer ave-
nues for bringing together the depictions of
top management strategic decision making in
the resource orchestration and upper echelons
streams of research. Resource orchestration re-
search describes how upper managers marshal
resourcesandcoordinate theeffortsofworkersand
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managers in the firm around strategic initiatives
(e.g., Sirmon et al., 2011). Upper echelons research
emphasizes how upper-level managers’ instinc-
tive approaches to strategic decision making in-
fluence which strategic phenomena capture
their interest and the strategic choices that
managers make about these phenomena. Human
capital management may be one domain
where both explanations of managers’ strategic
decision making—conscious resource orchestra-
tion and intuitive, default approaches to strategic
decisions—may have explanatory power. Firms
do, indeed, regularly make conscious human
capitalmanagement decisions, but their decisions
are also strongly influenced by top managers’ im-
plicit theories about how to manage people stra-
tegically. For example, Baron, Burton, andHannan
(1996) found that Silicon Valley IPO firms were
imprinted with their entrepreneurial founders’
values, many of which reflected the founders’
personalities and life experiences in addition to
conscious strategic calculation, and that these
values had long-lasting effects on their firms’ ap-
proaches to managing their human capital.
Opportunities for Future Research
Noother type of resource has freewill, butmany
of the dynamics outlined here may take place
when ownership of an important resource is di-
vided between two or more parties and cannot be
resolved by simple purchase. For example, when
a restaurant chain franchises, both parties—the
chain and franchisees—control important assets
that give them bargaining power over the value
created by those assets. Strategic factor market
frictions, idiosyncratic firm complementarities,
and inherent scarcity favoring one party over the
other can influence thedistribution of value inuse
in these cases, too. Thus, despite human capital’s
unique complexity, the SHC research stream, as it
evolves, may inform our understanding of firm
rents from other types of resources.
Additionally, the arguments in this article draw
stronger connections with the underlying eco-
nomics of human capital in ways that have been
obscured by the field’s emphasis on classic hu-
man capital theory, which, ironically, originated
in labor economics. Strategic factormarket theory
and RBT apply economic reasoning. Thus, there
are unexplored intersections between labor eco-
nomic models of optimal employment based on
marginal revenues and costs and the RBT-based
arguments about expanding firms’human capital
rents that are encapsulated in Figure 1. One dif-
ference between the two streams of research is
that this article’s conceptual logic builds from the
firm level to (implicitly) competitive interactions
in populations of firms, while labor economists
tend to work down from the broad markets to the
decisions that firms make. Nevertheless, there is
an interesting opportunity for SHC scholars to
broaden ourselves conceptually by building
a bridge to labor economics.9 This is particularly
true with respect to labor market frictions, a topic
with which labor economists are very familiar.
Another question for future research concerns
the functional forms of human capital comple-
mentarities. The current nascent stream of re-
search on human capital complementarities in
SHC is mostly concerned with documenting that
complementarities exist and, secondarily, with
cataloging the different types of constructs that
can create complementarities with human capi-
tal. Yet Ennen and Richter (2010), among other
observers, have noted that the functional form of
complementarities can vary significantly inways
that affect the returns to those interactions. How
firms should structure complementarities with
human capital in order tomaximize rents is as yet
a largely unexplored topic.
Similarly, the corporate governance structures
that are most amenable to human capital com-
plementarities (and the other factors that drive
human capital rents in Figure 2) are still ambig-
uous. Workers’ human capital can be acquired
under a variety of employment modes, running
the continuum from full incorporation within the
firm’s management structure to spot market ex-
changes where workers provide a specific tem-
porary service to the firm. This issue bears on
the larger question of what a firm is or, perhaps
more precisely, whom a firm is. How much must
workers be in or out of a firm for the firm to garner
human capital rents? Must, for instance, workers
with inherently scarce human capital be lo-
cated within the firm’s hierarchy for it to capture
the rents so generated? The way forward here
may involve an intersection between transaction
costs economics, which emphasizes a continuum
of governance structures, and the SHRM litera-
ture, which has a tradition of examining different
9 I thank an anonymous AMR reviewer for suggesting this
point.
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employment relationships for different groups
of workers.
Indeed, this article’s discussion of human capi-
tal scarcity and value in use evokes an influential
theoretic framework in the SHRM stream of re-
search found in Lepak and Snell (1999). These au-
thors proposed optimal employment modes for
different combinations of value in use and firm
specificity. For example, they posited that when
human capital is low in both value in use and firm
specificity, the rent-maximizing approach is
transactional, emphasizing spot market contract-
ing in human capital acquisition and compliance
commitment in human capital management. The
perspectives in this article put a finer point on
Lepak and Snell’s arguments. The authors’ defi-
nition of value in use (1999: 35) contrasts returns
(“strategic benefits to customers”) from human
capital with the costs incurred for that human
capital, as I do here. However, the distinction be-
tween value creation and value capture does not
appear in Lepak and Snell’s framework. Rather,
value in use is assumed to be either high or low
exogenously, when, in fact, it is an endogenous
reflection of both inherent human capital charac-
teristics and factors under firms’ control, such as
complementarities. Additionally, Lepak and Snell
focused the other axis of their framework on hu-
man capital firm specificity. As I discussed above,
firm specificity gives a limited view of value cap-
ture with respect to human capital rents, since
labor market frictions of many types can increase
human capital scarcity.
Nevertheless, Lepak and Snell’s (1999) insights
and those that others have subsequently built in
SHRM research can help point theway toward the
employmentmodes that firms could use to govern
their pursuit of human capital rents, a topic that
deserves greater development in SHC research.
For instance, one theme in SHRM research is the
importance of structuringworkforces to be able to
extend guarantees of employment stability to
workerswith highly valued human capital. SHRM
scholars have emphasized that a way to credibly
make such guarantees to “core”workers is to use
another set of “peripheral” workers with tempo-
rary employment contracts to buffer the firm’s
workforce from fluctuations in product market
demand, an intriguing proposition that has yet to
be explored in SHC research.
An additional opportunity suggested by my ar-
guments in this article lies in expanding the types
of workers highlighted in SHC research. Despite
recent attention given to middle managers and
other lower-level workers (e.g., Wooldridge,
Schmid, & Floyd, 2008), it is traditional in the
strategy field to emphasize top-level managers,
such as CEOs, COOs, functional heads, and
board members, as the workers whose actions
most influence firm performance (e.g., Mackey,
2008). SHC scholars have shown an analogous
propensity to favor various kinds of “star”workers
with clearly critical human capital, such as law-
yers, investment analysts, and professional ath-
letes. They have had less to say about how to
manage the human capital of other types of
workers, such as temps, clerks, receptionists,
maintenance workers, and so forth. This article’s
framework suggests how firmscanpursuehuman
capital rents from a variety of workers, not just
those whose human capital is inherently scarce
and valuable, and, thus, it can help expand the
SHC conversation.
A further opportunity to expand this article’s
reasoning concerns other types of human capital
in addition to generic and inherently scarce hu-
man capital. These two types of human capital
represent ends of a continuum with respect to
human capital’s intrinsic scarcity. It is possible
that other key attributes of human capital can be
used to generate a broader typology of human
capital that is pertinent to human capital rents,
whichwould enhance the story told in this article,
particularly about the ways human capital gen-
erates value in use. To date, SHC scholars have
beenmore successful in describing value capture
than how human capital value creation works.
Perhaps more fully defining how various types of
human capital differ is a way to begin to redress
that imbalance.
An intriguing example of such opportunities
lies in Molloy and Barney’s (2015) article. The au-
thors contrast general human capital with three
different kinds of firm-specific human capital—
required, discretionary, and cospecialized firm-
specific human capital. They interact these
different types of human capital with variance in
labor market competitiveness to determine how
value in use is split between workers and firms.
The authors’ general point that human capital
value appropriation occurs in the context of labor
market conditions is consistent with my argu-
ments here. It would be intriguing to push past
this point to detail how value creation also differs
in its essential characteristics across conditions
both internal and external to the firm, such as
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when the firm is utilizing stocks of inherently
scarce human capital or other types of human
capital not yet explicitly treated in the SHC
literature.
Indeed, another opportunity for future research
lies in elaborating themicrofoundations of human
capital value in use and the cost of human capital.
A “deep dive” of this sort would be amore detailed
description of interactions between workers and
more specifically delineated human capital–
related capabilities, something that is beyond the
scope of this article. For instance, HRM scholars
have suggested that realistic job previews can in-
crease the possibility of making productive
matches between workers and firms by allowing
workers to bring their proprietary knowledge of
their capabilities into the recruiting and selection
process. Realistic job previews may be a more
strategically valuable tool when the costs of
a mismatch between firms and workers are par-
ticularly high and when information asymmetries
regarding human capital’s potential value in use
are especially acute. Realistic job previews may
also bemore useful in acquiring inherently scarce
human capital than they are for jobs where firm
complementaritieswithgenerichumancapitalare
the primary driver of human capital rents. Perhaps
the most important area for SHC microfounda-
tional work lies in specifying how individual
workers’ interactions with firms lead to the firm-
level relationships between constructs that I have
described. As other SHC scholars have forcefully
argued, firm-levelSHCrelationshipsarenot simple
additive aggregations of a series of individual-
level interactions (e.g., Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011).
Specifying microfoundations such as these there-
foreoffers considerablepotential toenrich theSHC
research conversation (cf. Coff & Kryscynski, 2011;
Ployhart et al., 2014).
As I suggested at the beginning of the article,
these explorationswill bemore fruitful when they
acknowledge workers’ free will and their perpet-
ual ownership of their human capital. Both of
these dimensions certainly add complexity to the
human capital rents story. For instance, in addi-
tion to its influence on human capital value cre-
ation, freewill impacts the bargaining that occurs
between workers and firms over human capital
value in use. Since employment is an affective re-
lationship as well as a labor economic exchange
(Wangetal., 2009), firms’approaches tobargaining
with workers need to acknowledge both of these
facets (such as, for instance, attending to both
procedural justice and distributive justice). This
makes such bargaining complex and prone to
missteps on the part of the firm. Therefore, the
ability to effectively bargain with workers may be
yet another human capital–related capability of
firms that drives differences in human capital
rents. As I noted earlier, no other class of resources
that firms use is subject to both perpetual owner-
ship and free will, attributes that make firms’ pur-
suit of human capital rents both different and
more hazardous than seeking rents through other
types of firm resources. In general, the notion that
workers’ utility functions encompass other out-
comes such as fulfilling work, employment sta-
bility, and relationshipswith coworkers offers rich
opportunities to sketch out human capital rents’
microfoundations more completely (cf. Molloy &
Barney, 2015).
CONCLUSION
This article has described a number of potential
avenues that firms could take to create and secure
human capital rents. These avenues leverage idi-
osyncratic firm capabilities and resources to en-
hance value in use and to decrease firms’ cost of
human capital. The two processes that determine
value in use and the cost of human capital (human
capital value creation and value capture) are dis-
tinct but interrelated, and together they determine
the extent to which firms garner human capital
rents. As strategy researchers have emphasized
for some time, firms’ rents are rooted in the dis-
tinctive capabilities and unique resources that
firms bring to the competitive arena. With respect
to human capital, firms’ options to accrue rents are
far broader than commonly acknowledged to date.
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